tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post4008143599731934200..comments2022-09-18T11:14:36.876-04:00Comments on Neurochannels: Consciousness (13): The Interpreter versus the ScribeEric Thomsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comBlogger25125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-79196505012303654812010-06-17T12:53:34.681-04:002010-06-17T12:53:34.681-04:00Charles:
Our disconnect is that you consider "...Charles:<br /><i>Our disconnect is that you consider "consciousness" to be in the same functional category as digestion, walking, vision, speaking, et al</i><br /><br />Yes, for now I am assuming that consciousness is a biological process, as those other things are.<br /><br />Then you added:<br /><i>the category of functions for which it is relatively clear what subfunctions play a Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-16129832488235520992010-06-17T12:07:39.641-04:002010-06-17T12:07:39.641-04:00eric -
Our disconnect is that you consider "...eric -<br /><br />Our disconnect is that you consider "consciousness" to be in the same functional category as digestion, walking, vision, speaking, et al - the category of functions for which it is relatively clear what subfunctions play a role. For example, in the case of vision, you know where to to burrow down into the details - the retina, specific parts of the cortex, etc.<br /><Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-86349341881480476632010-06-16T15:14:50.263-04:002010-06-16T15:14:50.263-04:00Ultimately I see it as an empirical question what ...Ultimately I see it as an empirical question what levels are needed to explain any given phenomenon. E.g., for retinal phototransduction we will likely need quantum mechanics. For the behavior of large (i.e., thousands or more) populations of neurons, the formalism from Hodgkin and Huxely (or other scaled-down models) start to take precedence. The way we find out what is important is by studying Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-24786530236390678172010-06-16T14:41:05.607-04:002010-06-16T14:41:05.607-04:00eric -
Well, it appears there is an unbridgeable ...eric -<br /><br />Well, it appears there is an unbridgeable gap between what we consider "concrete and specific rather than generic and abstract". I view the various relevant fields - physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, psychology, et al - as differing in the level of integration they are addressing. At each level there are "concrete and specific" issues to be addressed Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-35549298262173927542010-06-16T13:57:08.465-04:002010-06-16T13:57:08.465-04:00Charles: I don't think there is a consensus, b...Charles: I don't think there is a consensus, but there is a lot known. They are different :)<br /><br />I think it is a mistake to worry too much about a precise definition before the science is more developed (imagine if biologists had spent a lot of time defining 'life' rather than studying things that they already knew were living).<br /><br />I have a fundamentally different Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-80476835636211646462010-06-16T12:51:11.209-04:002010-06-16T12:51:11.209-04:00Eric -
I submitted this yesterday, but it seems t...Eric -<br /><br />I submitted this yesterday, but it seems to have disappeared.<br />====================================<br />You obviously have a much clearer idea of how to attack "consciousness" than I do - or, as nearly as I've been able to tell, than do numerous people who - unlike me - do have some credibility. Are the Koch/Crick information theoretical view, the Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-67138280522331010502010-06-15T21:32:26.918-04:002010-06-15T21:32:26.918-04:00Charles: yes, I saw that qualifier, and thought it...Charles: yes, I saw that qualifier, and thought it was necessary. My concern is this throws into question the method of trimming away functions one by one they way you are trying to do. It seems a more fruitful approach to look at how multiple subsystems interact to produce consciousness, and take a more data-driven empirical approach.Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-12350028765323410272010-06-15T20:43:52.050-04:002010-06-15T20:43:52.050-04:00"This doesn't follow."
Correct - an..."This doesn't follow."<br /><br />Correct - an editing oversight. Although I failed to change the part you quoted, I explicitly addressed the point in the last sentence of that paragraph, and added "stand-alone" in the next to cover it.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-35449853121967239882010-06-15T13:55:03.057-04:002010-06-15T13:55:03.057-04:00Charles:
All I meant to say was that IF we can cre...Charles:<br /><i>All I meant to say was that IF we can create an inanimate entity that implements a specific functionality, we can't use that functionality as evidence of the existence of something we choose to label "consciousness</i><br /><br />This doesn't follow. As I said, it could be necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. If we have a four-step process, then just Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-34288688375604851922010-06-15T13:05:32.736-04:002010-06-15T13:05:32.736-04:00OK, back home and with access to a computer.
&qu...OK, back home and with access to a computer. <br /><br />"Generally I wouldn't take whether we could program something ourselves as evidence that it isn't important for consciousness."<br /><br />All I meant to say was that IF we can create an inanimate entity that implements a specific functionality, we can't use that functionality in as evidence of the existence of Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-80522564890679996932010-06-12T14:51:24.376-04:002010-06-12T14:51:24.376-04:00Charles, I think you are on the right track. One o...Charles, I think you are on the right track. One of the main lines of thought in the neural coding literature is that the brain engages in prediction of states of the world (whether these predictions be of future or present states usually depends on the task being analyzed). Bistable percepts are often described as two different estimates or predictions (or hypotheses) about what is in the world.Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-62610448770053550512010-06-11T01:48:04.352-04:002010-06-11T01:48:04.352-04:00eric -
Good stuff.
To illustrate how I am tryin...eric -<br /><br />Good stuff. <br /><br />To illustrate how I am trying to approach the issue, I'll consider the illusion you call "bistable perception". I'll start by doing what Gary Williams alluded to in one of his comments - flash back to the needs of our more primitive ancestors, or even to pre-humans, then work forward to more capable critters.<br /><br />I assume that oneCharles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-48303297604506468742010-05-22T10:09:14.407-04:002010-05-22T10:09:14.407-04:00Jonathan: I think I'd want to say that without...Jonathan: I think I'd want to say that without contents, there isn't consciousness. However, I would prefer to just have no opinion at this point, and say that while you could be right that there is a consciousness there even in deep sleep, it is more fruitful to start with instances where there is little question that we are conscious. That way we don't have to get bogged down in theEric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-74498837496781407792010-05-22T04:46:29.240-04:002010-05-22T04:46:29.240-04:00Hi, Jonathan Speke Laudly here,
The operation o...Hi, Jonathan Speke Laudly here,<br /> The operation of the brain as<br />observed could be content too!<br /> Consciousness could be fundamental and giving rise to the to the physical world and to some sense of individuality or self.<br /> That consciousness is created by an organized bunch of atoms--is an assumption.<br /> When a person becomes what is commonly called unconscous--as in deep Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-87198154923716158962010-05-16T20:02:02.694-04:002010-05-16T20:02:02.694-04:00Previously I had included the following in the pos...Previously I had included the following in the post as a footnote to the discussion of ambiguous squares, but cut it just because of space considerations. I probably should have kept it in:<br />"Obviously, in real-life perception, the world overflows with additional cues and constraints that would tell us how far away the square was. For instance, can you reach and touch it? If you move, Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-4511351278247850612010-05-09T16:59:02.828-04:002010-05-09T16:59:02.828-04:00I was out on a bike ride thinking about this discu...I was out on a bike ride thinking about this discussion, and it seems a lot of talking past each other. If by "consciousness" you mean some language-dependent thing that comes into existence via some kind of cultural symbolic scaffolding operation, then we are not talking about the same thing. I am talking about basic perceptual awareness, all the evidence suggests it exists in monkeys,Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-67679053629861031312010-05-09T11:50:05.695-04:002010-05-09T11:50:05.695-04:00Gary:
Cases of anesthesia paralysis the patients ...Gary: <br />Cases of anesthesia paralysis the patients aren't moving at all, obviously if they were doing saccades the anesthesiologists would stop the surgery immediately! I'm not attacking any specific philosopher, but an attitude I've encountered in phil departments hat is surprisingly naively behavioristic in a new dress.<br /><br />I'm really not trying to engage philosophersEric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-44136095326860402752010-05-09T10:55:06.344-04:002010-05-09T10:55:06.344-04:00As for Jaynes, I think he is extremely compatible ...As for Jaynes, I think he is extremely compatible with modern neuropsychological research. Check out the following papers:<br /><br />Olin, R. (1999). Auditory hallucinations and the bicameral mind. The Lancet, 354(Jul 10), 166.<br /><br />Cavanna, A., Trimble, M., Cinti, F., & Monaco, F. (2007). The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: a critical reappraisal of Julian Jaynes’ hypothesis. FunctionalGary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-6541567172533556492010-05-09T10:55:06.345-04:002010-05-09T10:55:06.345-04:00"To wit: if someone accepts that dreams are a..."To wit: if someone accepts that dreams are a type of experience, that paralyzed people can have experiences (which we know is true based on horrible anesthesia mishaps), then any view that movement or skilled interaction with the world is necessary for experience is immediately falsified."<br /><br /><br />I don't know any embodiment theorist who makes the claim that crude motor Gary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-9631905641081251832010-05-09T09:59:34.336-04:002010-05-09T09:59:34.336-04:00Just a few loose ends:
I don't actually think...Just a few loose ends:<br /><br />I don't actually think that all stimuli are always ambiguous. I just think that stimuli that are ambiguous are useful for revealing things about how normal perception works. It is an empiricial question how much ambiguity there is in the retinal array, and likely it depends strongly on the type of stimulus (e.g., color versus shape versus distance versus sizeEric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-69465441377541582792010-05-09T09:06:20.783-04:002010-05-09T09:06:20.783-04:00"At any rate, we have fundamental disagreemen..."At any rate, we have fundamental disagreements here."<br /><br /><br />I guess we can agree to disagree then:)<br /><br />But yeah, it seems that we are both operating with a different set of assumptions about (1) what constitutes the perceptual stimulus and (2) how the brain reacts to that stimulus. You assume that the stimulus is very much poor (ambiguous) and the brain needs to Gary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-26568660749687288632010-05-08T23:14:49.528-04:002010-05-08T23:14:49.528-04:00Gary:
I would say that ambiguous stimuli aren'...Gary:<br />I would say that ambiguous stimuli aren't of merely academic interest, for a couple of reasons. One, they don't just happen in ivory towers. The rotating key example I gave above was not from an experiment or lab; it happened out walking around with a big crowd of people that all saw the illusion and couldn't figure out what was going on (I, on the other hand, had just Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-79289522052654602332010-05-08T18:51:54.092-04:002010-05-08T18:51:54.092-04:00While I certainly agree that the brain contributes...While I certainly agree that the brain contributes a lot to experience, all the examples you use (necker cubes, spinning girls,etc.) seem irrelevant to the kinds of perceptual experience our evolutionary ancestors had for millions of years. All the examples seem "academically neat" or "lab neat". You say ecological approaches fail to adequately deal with hallucinations, dreamsGary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-90093406877980135662010-05-07T14:48:24.284-04:002010-05-07T14:48:24.284-04:00Gary: good point that the ambiguity can sometimes ...Gary: good point that the ambiguity can sometimes be resolved by multiple factors. One example you point out is movement of the animal or its eyes. I had included a long caveat footnote about this, but it seemed a bit too much. <br /><br />Regardless, it is clear the brain makes its own contributions to the experience, that it isn't merely a matter of picking up information that is there in Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13710336.post-13195111401948300202010-05-07T13:30:34.421-04:002010-05-07T13:30:34.421-04:00"Consider the case in which a projection onto..."Consider the case in which a projection onto the retina is square-shaped. What can we say about the object that generated that projection? Assuming there are no distance cues present, the same square shape on the retina could be produced by a tiny square that is extremely close to the eye, a medium-sized square a moderate distance away, or a colossal square that is extremely far away....<brGary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.comnoreply@blogger.com